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Political economy analysis, aid effectiveness and the art of 
development management 
James G. Copestake 
Abstract 
Recognising that aid effectiveness critically depends upon the quality of host country institutions 
and policies, international aid agencies have sought to inform their activities through more 
systematic political economy analysis (PEA). Three analytical frameworks for PEA are compared, 
contrasted and critically appraised in the light reflections of PEA practitioners and recent 
theoretical debate about development management. We conclude that the potential of PEA to 
improve development effectiveness depends on how far it addresses the micro as well as macro 
politics of aid, and permits a finer grained engagement between analysis and action. This 
requires more reflexivity on the part of those who commission and produce PEA, and further 
movement from intervention to interaction modalities for aid delivery. 
Key words: political economy analysis; development management; aid effectiveness; complexity  
  
1 Introduction 
Aid effectiveness, from a traditional Northern donor perspective, hinges on finding development 
partners who are both ‘committed’ to common goals and ‘capable’ of absorbing extra resources 
to help achieve them: see DFID’s 2011 review of its entire bilateral and multilateral partnership 
portfolio, for example. But such assessment is severely complicated by the difficulty of 
measuring both concepts, and by their variation within agencies and over time, not least 
because of their mutual interdependence (Waterman and Meier, 1998). This paper explores an 
alternative perspective on aid effectiveness as both a “wicked problem” (Grint, 2005), and one 
that is deeply and unavoidably political (e.g. see Killick, 2004; Hyden, 2008; Hayman, 2009; 
Booth, 2011). It does so by exploring how, and how well, donor activities are informed by 
effective political economy analysis (PEA).  
The outcome document from the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, that took place 
in Busan at the end of 2011, makes no explicit mention of PEA, but it does implicitly highlight 
both its importance and complexity. External aid should sustain “democratic ownership” within 
recipient countries – by affirming the role of national parliaments and local government, for 
example. Traditional and non-traditional aid donors should also foster “inclusive relationships” 
among themselves; respond to rights-based approaches promoted by civil society organisations 
and build links with the private sector. They should facilitate “joint risk management” and be 
transparent about what they spend and how. Target setting and results orientation should be 
complemented by more open processes of consultation, including those aimed at  building 
partnerships between donors and national recipients over assessment, sequencing and 
evaluation of institutional and policy change (FHLFAE, 2011). 
Current donor frameworks for PEA have evolved without much, if any, reference to a concurrent 
revival of academic interest in development management theory (DMT), despite overlapping 
emphasis on power, stakeholder incentives and implications for aid effectiveness. Like PEA, the 
origins of DMT are old and diffuse. Its recent revival centres on a schism between the extensive 
literature on management as a planned, rational and above all controlled process, and a 
contrarian view that regards such “managerialism” as anathema to a political view of 
development as liberation or empowerment (Gulrajani, 2010). Gulrajani sets out to identify 
scope for planned management of human development that can overcome this dilemma. She 
calls such activity “romantic management” in recognition that it is likely to depart from at least 
some of the Western Enlightenment assumptions that underpin dominant development 
management thinking, such as the idea that there is one universal ‘best-practice’ framework for 
PEA that exists independently of who uses it, and in what context.1 In re-examining PEA as a 
management tool, we broaden its focus from aid recipient countries to include the diverse range 
of donors collaborating with them, and explore how far the use and utility of such analysis can 
also be broadened. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of PEA and of on-going 
debate over its strengths and weaknesses as an aid to development effectiveness. Section 3 
                                                          
1
 In a subsequent paper Gulrajani (2011) also refers to “romantic” as “radical-reformist”. We opt for 
the former term on the grounds that it echoes a distinct tradition in the social sciences, as recently 
explored by Bronk (2009). 
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examines this literature from a wider perspective by drawing on the DMT literature. Section 4 
mirrors the other papers in this Special Issue in turning the analytical spotlight on development 
agencies themselves; more specifically, by considering how PEA is utilised in the context of the 
complex, open-ended interactions between development agencies, consultants and other 
stakeholders involved in policymaking. Section 5 concludes that its usefulness as a tool for 
promoting romantic as well as reformist development management depends upon the freedom, 
willingness and capacity of users to adapt their own objectives and operational modalities in the 
light of what PEA reveals. Preoccupation with results-based management, rooted in rational 
actor ontology, limits the scope for its use in more open-ended and imaginative ways.  
2 PEA: A brief overview  
PEA is used by development agencies to enhance their understanding of the economic, political 
and social processes that drive or block policy reform. Their immediate purpose is to inform 
design, feasibility assessment, and implementation of development initiatives with a view to 
enhancing their effectiveness. 
2.1 Three leading examples 
Three PEA frameworks used by leading donors are briefly outlined below.2 The selection 
captures variation in the scope of analysis from national to sector level, as well as the 
chronological progression towards more focused and action-oriented analysis. We focus on 
broad conceptual frameworks offered by each approach, rather than more specific operational 
tools to facilitate their use (cf. World Bank, 2007).  
2.1.1 Drivers of change (DoC) analysis (DFID 2004) 
DoC was launched by DFID in 2001, and was used during the next few years to inform more than 
twenty country studies (Leftwich, 2006a; Scott, 2007). These sought to understand the main 
progressive and regressive political forces influencing poverty reduction. Although individual 
champions of reform are sought, drivers of change are viewed more broadly. A distinction is 
made between: (a) structural features, or natural and human resources, economic and social 
structures; (b) agents, or individuals and organisations pursuing particular interests; and (c) 
mediating institutions, comprising frameworks and rules structuring the behaviour of agents. 
The DoC framework avoids imposing a more elaborate framework on analysts, seeking instead 
to assist DFID country offices in identifying and understanding political dynamics most relevant 
to design of pro-poor interventions. The logical sequence is from detached analysis of country 
level dynamics (how the world is), to assessment relative to the normative goal of poverty 
reduction (how it should be), then finally to an assessment of what DFID can do to close the gap 
(how it could be).  
                                                          
2
 Other PEA frameworks that could have been included are SIDA’s Power Analysis, the Dutch Foreign 
Ministry's Strategic Governance and Corruption Assessment (SGACA), EC Sector Analysis, ODI’s 
sector framework (Moncrieffe and Luttrell 2005) and Leftwich (2006a&b, 2007). Also particularly 
relevant is the work of Grindle (2010; 2011) and analysis of (in)security, welfare and well-being 
regimes (Gough and Wood, 2004; Gough and McGregor, 2007; Copestake and Wood, 2008). Other 
reviews of PEA frameworks include Endlemen (2009) and Haider and Rao (2010). 
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2.1.2 The political economy of policy reform (World Bank 2008)  
This framework is intended to aid sector level reforms, and builds on evidence from World Bank 
engagement in agricultural marketing, water supply and sanitation sectors. The approach 
highlights distributional implications of proposed reforms through a threefold sequence of 
analysis, process and action. The “analysis” stage seeks understanding of how rules governing 
selected sectors are generated, followed and contested. This includes identification of key 
stakeholders and their role in each stage of the policy development process (from problem 
diagnosis to implementation) as well as links from the selected sector to relevant institutional 
and decision-making structures at the national level. The “process” stage addresses modalities 
for stakeholder interaction (e.g. partnerships, participation and leadership) and how these affect 
information flows, coalition building, public debate and transparency. The “action” stage 
extends analysis into reform implementation. This includes monitoring the political economy of 
timing and sequencing of reforms to inform pragmatic, flexible and strategic responses. It also 
emphasises the need to schedule “partnership-based reform debate” and to sustain the 
evidence base for policy making through monitoring, evaluation and communication strategies, 
including creating new channels for accountability. 
2.1.3 Problem-driven governance and political economy analysis (World Bank 2009) 
This framework aims to assist World Bank teams to learn “best practice” lessons from reform, 
provide them with a “menu of options” for conducting good diagnostic studies and translating 
them into action. Rather than offering a broad national analysis or sector focus it addresses a 
particular institutional problem or constraint. It also aims to identify how momentum for change 
can be fostered, thereby overcoming criticism of earlier governance assessments for a static 
emphasis on institutional gaps and weaknesses. There are again three stages: to identify a 
problem, challenge or “vulnerability”, to map relevant institutional and governance 
arrangements, and third to identify the political economy drivers and obstacles to change. The 
crux of the approach is on why institutional arrangements or policies are not supportive of a 
particular reform process. This is built around a distinction between structures, institutions and 
actors similar to that of DoC analysis. At the same time, it seeks to link analysis of risks facing 
particular policy reforms to strategies that World Bank country programmes can use to 
addressing them. This includes understanding strategies of other stakeholders, and 
opportunities for the World Bank to influence them in the political realm. It highlights the use of 
different types of communication strategies to build support for change, emphasising how the 
initial PEA can influence the type of policy dialogue to be used - from passive (“do no harm”), to 
active coalition building. It also provides in-depth guidance on what information to collect and 
how to analyse it. 
Similarities 
Table 1 summarises the distinctive focus of each framework on overall national political 
economy, sector-specific and problem-specific issues. At the same time, it is the similarities 
between them that are perhaps more striking. All three explore links between a structural 
context for an intervention, the key stakeholders affected and the influence of institutions on 
stakeholders’ opportunities and incentives for action. These similarities reflect common 
conceptual origins and academic reference points within the wider literature on economic 
Bath Papers in International Development and Well-Being 
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institutions, governance and policy making in low and middle income countries.3 Linked research 
into aid effectiveness forced staff in development agencies to recognise that it was inadequate 
for them to blame the failure of many supposedly ‘good’ policies on poor implementation or lack 
of ‘political will.’ More fundamentally, attempting to reconcile the case for enhancing ‘domestic 
ownership’ of policies without necessarily abandoning their own views prompted closer 
engagement with local policy processes (Hyden, 2008).  
Table 1: Summary of distinctive features of the three frameworks 
PEA framework  Distinctive features  
Drivers of Change  - Simple and flexible framework that can be adapted to diverse country 
contexts. 
- Aims for a comprehensive evolutionary analysis of country’s 
economic, social and political characteristics. 
The Political Economy 
of Policy Reform.  
- Evidence based, having been built from a comprehensive set of sector 
case studies.  
- Focus on the political dynamics of policy change: how reforms are 
tabled and why, how they are perceived, who supports, opposes and 
attempts to change them.   
- Includes an action framework to assist in translating analysis into 
operational implications. Emphasises the need to build partnerships 
and coalitions for change to overcome political sensitivity and to 
create the space for evidence-based discussion, negotiation and 
policy making.   
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis 
- Centres on a specific issue or problem with a view to guiding action as 
well as analysis. 
- Provides examples of PEA in action, and highlights operational 
implications of different stages of analysis. For example how it maps 
onto the World Bank’s operational strategy and types of public 
dialogue appropriate to each. 
 
In addition, the World Bank frameworks attempt to respond to criticism of DoC (elaborated 
below in section 2.2) for being short on guidance about how to use PEA to inform programme 
strategies. This is illustrated by Table 2.  
Table 2: Operational guidance included in PEA 
PEA framework Guidance to inform programme activity 
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis  
- Assists policy engagement and “partnership based reform 
programmes” through a flexible approach that manages risks, public 
dialogue and “coalitions for change”. 
- Links analysis and communication strategies through understanding 
                                                          
3
 These include Stiglitz on market failures, North on path-dependency, Grindle on policy analysis, 
Bates on the politics of economic reform and Williamson on institutional embeddedness.  More rarely 
cited is Mahoney and Thelen (2009) on institutional change, and Powleson’s (1994) work on power 
diffusion that anticipated the contribution of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). 
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stakeholder concerns and facilitating wider engagement where 
needed.   
- Provides information on what is feasible for external actors and 
therefore how to influence strategies in the short and long term.  
This includes analysis of current strategies of stakeholders and 
potential windows of opportunity. 
- Highlights scope for using PEA to enhance policy dialogue and foster 
innovative approaches to operations through a more granular 
understanding of the behaviour of stakeholders. For example going 
past the proponents/opponents dichotomy. 
Problem Driven 
Governance and 
Political Economy 
Analysis  
- Provides information on what is feasible for external actors to 
influence strategies over the short and long term.  This includes 
analysis of the strategies of other stakeholders and of potential 
windows for opportunity. 
- Takes into account and manages risks; for example through public 
dialogue strategies and building coalitions for change. 
- Integrates evidence-based policy making with partnership based 
reform programmes. 
- Links analysis with monitoring and evaluation, and with 
communication strategy, through improved understanding stakeholder 
concerns, leading to more participatory approaches where needed.   
- Realign accountability frameworks through analysis of demand and 
supply for information. 
 
2.2. Critical debate over PEA. 
PEA as a mainstream development management tool is still relatively new, but has already been 
the subject of substantial critical discussion (Unsworth, 2007; 2008; 2009; Leftwich, 2006a; 
2006b; 2007; Duncan and Williams, 2012; Grindle, 2010; 2011; and World Bank Institute and 
CommGap, 2010, for example). Four perceived strengths of PEA can first be identified. First, 
while proponents of PEA did not, of course, introduce the analysis of institutions into 
development practice, they can claim to have promoted a wider and more realistic 
understanding of their functions including the importance of informal norms and beliefs. This 
has helped to counter simplistic assumptions that development can proceed through transfer or 
promotion of universal ‘best practices’ with a greater appreciation of contextual constraints. 
Landell-Mills et al (2007; 2), suggests that the focus on institutions, particularly informal 
institutions, amounts to a ‘new political economy perspective’ (NPEP) – “The most striking 
feature of the NPEP is that it combines a strong sociological component with political analysis, 
taking account of embedded beliefs, cultural norms and ethnicity that change only gradually, 
and yet have a profound influence on the way agents act and react…”4  
Second, PEA has promoted a more open discussion of power within the donor community and of 
the political processes through which policy is both formulated and implemented. This has 
promoted deeper analysis of stakeholders’ capacity to subvert and countered simplistic 
                                                          
4
 Leftwich (2006a) caveats this by highlighting that the conceptual ambiguity between structural 
features and institutions in DoC studies partly led to largely agent centric analysis with broader social 
and cultural influences not fully incorporated or explained. 
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explanations of policy failure as ‘lack of political will’. By giving donors greater insight into 
commitment and capacity for country-led reform PEA thereby directly addresses the aid 
effectiveness agenda, though it leaves open the question of how far they are themselves willing 
and able to adjust their strategies accordingly. 
A third and more general point, linked to both of these is that PEA has injected greater realism 
into development policy and practice and the need to engage with the political struggle. Fourth, 
the development of PEA frameworks and tools bring a more systematic approach to analysis, in 
pursuit of methodological consistency. This opens up the possibility that tacit knowledge and 
hard-won experience of individuals can be lodged more firmly in institutional memory. 
Unsworth (2008: 1) illustrates the last two points by stating that PEA “contrasts with more 
normative approaches to governance assessment that focus on how formal institutions are 
performing, or political reporting of embassies that tends to be preoccupied with current events 
and actors”. 
At the same time, practitioners continue to find weaknesses in PEA as a development tool, citing 
the failure to change fundamentally the way agencies operate (Thornton and Cox, 2005; DFID 
2005; Landell-Mills et al, 2007; Unsworth, 2007; and Foresti and Wild, 2009). While recognising 
that PEA has contributed to a deeper understanding of the nature of development problems, it 
remains less clear to them how useful it is in identifying solutions. This section reviews four 
criticisms: excessive scope, which makes it hard to draw specific conclusions; overly abstract 
language; the politically sensitive nature of findings; and the organisational difficulties of 
translating findings into action. 
The scoping problem was highlighted by a review of early DoC studies (Thornton and Cox, 2005). 
They were found to generate broad conclusions about underlying influences on change within 
selected countries, for example the recognition of neo-patrimonial relationships. But this was at 
the expense of more detailed analysis of specific agencies and their incentives, and in the 
absence of such analysis it was difficult for donors to identify and prioritise stakeholders who 
they could align with most effectively. In addition the focus on historical processes, particularly 
in the case of DoC distracted attention from understanding the more relevant short to medium 
term dynamics of reform (Leftwich, 2006; Haider and Rao, 2010).   
Second, non-specialists find the academic language used in PEA studies abstract and often over-
elaborate. At the same time, detailed description of the numerous groups and structures in 
society confront them with a level of institutional complexity that is hard to incorporate into 
standardised country strategies and logical frameworks. It was also not feasible to collect the 
data and evidence required to ground theoretical frameworks adequately in local empirical 
reality (Haider and Rao, 2010). 
Third, the political sensitivity of these studies inhibited dissemination of results and thereby 
limited scope for dialogue with local actors over the findings. An evaluation by DFID into DoC 
studies concluded that they were most successful when tailored versions of reports were 
presented to different audiences (DFID, 2005; Haider and Rao, 2010). As Landell-Mills et al 
(2007) note: “a key challenge is to find ways to conduct such studies in a manner that is non-
confrontational, but avoids being secretive”. Indeed, there is inherent tension in the extent to 
which such studies can lead to enhanced ownership; joint studies present the potential for 
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increased contextual understanding and ownership of its findings and operational implications 
but risk bias or suppression. Unsworth (2009) highlights the fear among donors that sharing or 
implementing findings of PEA could jeopardize important relationships or “rock the boat”.  
PEA can pose a similar risk for bilateral agencies with respect to relations with their political 
principals and accountability to taxpayers. For example, Duncan and Williams (2010) point out 
that second best or “good enough” solutions suggested by PEA  are harder to explain and to 
justify than, say, direct investments in schools and roads. As Grindle (2011: 2) states, “scholars of 
development rise fast if they produce parsimonious truths rather than complicated options”. 
This reflects the norm of presenting development as technical rather than political, and is 
reinforced by internal performance structures that incentivise disbursement of funds or 
deployment of technical experts.5 While PEA can still be justified as a tool for managing 
programme risks, emphasis on demonstrable impact and value for money can work against 
interventions aimed at tackling deeper and more long-term institutional issues (Eyben, 2008). 
There appear to be clear diagnostic benefits of PEA, but significant challenges remain in 
translating these into donors’ existing operational practices to enhance aid effectiveness. The 
ideal may be that PEA frameworks furnishes a deeper  understanding of local problems, 
institutions and ways of addressing them; the reality may be that they do little more than 
embellish engrained intervention models used by donors informed by perceived deviation from 
universal ideals of ‘good governance’ with very little regard to local specifics (Grindle, 2007). 
Unsworth (2007: 1) argues that this is the case at the corporate level within donors, with an 
essentially technocratic approach continuing to dominate. She states that “overall, the impact of 
political science research has been patchy. Policymakers may be talking about politics, while still 
thinking in quite conventional ways about governance and development”. 
3. PEA and Development Management Theory. 
At its most general, PEA is necessary for any public or private organisation, particularly in 
turbulent and uncertain times (e.g. The Economist, 2011:74). If broadly defined as a form of 
horizon scanning and problem diagnosis, then its integration into strategic decision making is a 
generic management problem. The narrower issue pursued here is with the micro-level politics 
of using PEA to inform the strategies and actions of development agencies themselves.   
Our starting point is a longstanding tendency in the academic literature on development 
administration and management for schism (McCourt and Gulrajani, 2010). On one side are 
reformist writers, who while not uncritical of existing practice, accept that promoting poverty 
reduction and related development through planned, rational, technical and controlled 
processes is at least possible. In opposition are writers for whom management (pejoratively 
labelled ‘managerialism’) is anathema to development as a political process of empowerment 
and emancipation of the many. Gulrajani (2010:136) calls this contemporary radical perspective 
“Critical Development Management” (CDM) to reflect its roots in both “Foucauldian post-
                                                          
5
 Duncan and Williams (2010) also highlight other factors such as an inflated view of donor’s 
importance; a preference for working with formal institutions and a lack of understanding of the 
informal. In practical terms, overly-rapid staff turnover restricts staff from being able to develop the 
necessary depth of understanding. 
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development theory and neo-Marxian critical management studies”.6 By tracing the origins of 
managerialism, as a rational scientific pathway to progress, back to its 18th Century 
Enlightenment roots she opens up the possibility of a more imaginative, intuitive, and value-
laden “romantic” perspective on development perspective. This, she suggests, represents a 
distinct form of “non-managerial development practice” that is neither reformist nor radical. 
Three key characteristics of this tradition, she suggests, are: first, a strong emphasis on diverse 
experiential knowledge; second, an emphasis on performance, improvisation and intuition; and 
third, a heightened degree of reflexivity among practitioners rooted in the unavoidably 
contingent and contested nature of their practice.7 This echoes Richards (1989), who compares 
small-scale farmers to musicians in order to extol their local knowledge and creative 
improvisation, contrasting this with a more mechanical view of their role as passive recipients of 
extension advice from all-knowing agricultural scientists.  
An alternative route to a similar conclusion about development practice starts from an explicit 
recognition of complexity and uncertainty as core experiences of development practitioners 
(Ramalingam, 2008).  Confronted with the impossibility of being all-knowing, people are forced 
to act on the basis of simplified mental models (North, 1990). The diversity of their experience 
produces a multiplicity of such models, and limits the scope for agreement on a single 
overarching vision or plan.8 Instead, fragmented and often competing ideas regarding 
development proliferate, with no one position or stakeholder capable of capturing the full 
picture. As Enberg-Perderson (2012) explains, one response to this has been the decentralisation 
of aid agencies in an attempt to accommodate and promote such diversity. However, which 
ideas or visions are legitimised and become dominant depends on messy processes of 
interaction that reflect prevailing power imbalances (Eyben, 2008).  
This is not to diminish the importance of seeking new understanding, building consensus and 
developing coherent plans for action. But it helps to explain why such endeavours often fail, and 
serves as a reminder that development is not the logical outcome of negotiations between all-
knowing actors, but an evolutionary process replete with discoveries, surprises and accidents 
(Mowles et al 2008; Mowles, 2010). PEA, from this perspective, can itself be viewed as 
embellishing a relatively narrow and technocratic shared mental model of development 
management as rational planning. Rather than a mutual examination of the aid process it can 
reinforce an outward focus, with the development agency itself largely absent from diagnostic 
analysis, except as one stakeholder in the mix – with its own internal norms, competing mental 
models, interests, internal politics and processes off limits.  
                                                          
6
 Gulrajani (2011) finesses this distinction further by noting the existence of left and right wing 
variants of the radical critique of aid effectiveness, united only in their critique of mainstream 
reformism. 
7
 Bronk (2009) identifies the romantic tradition in economics as drawing more upon organic than 
mechanistic metaphors, emphasising non-commensurable values, resisting over-reliance on rational 
actor assumptions about individual motivation and emphasising the importance of imagination. 
8
 See also Denzau and North (1994) for a discussion of the idea of shared mental models. North 
(1990: 17) observes that “individuals make choices based on subjectively derived models ... the 
information actors receive is so incomplete that in most cases these divergent subjective models 
show no tendency to converge”. 
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In turning the analytical spotlight of PEA back on the sponsoring development agency itself, we 
connect with a wider “aidnography” literature that emphasises the value of empirical research 
into how development works, as well as whether it succeeds (Lewis and Mosse, 2006). This also 
links with Gulrajani’s (2012) examination of how different environments, governance structures, 
goals and levels of discretion influence donor organisations. This sets the scene for future 
research into the extent to which PEA may reform but ultimately reinforce a managerial process 
of aid intervention, or open up new romantic possibilities for interaction among PEA analyst, 
client and other stakeholders and ultimately contribute to enhanced development effectiveness. 
4. Problematising development practice 
4.1. From intervention to interaction models 
In its current guise, discussion of PEA is relatively silent on the micro-politics of the 
commissioning development agency itself: it is generally assumed to play a passive role in the 
analysis, and then appears as a deus ex machina at the intervention stage. The implication is that 
who carries out a PEA, and how, is not relevant to how it is used. Professionally conducted PEA 
should aspire to inform the commissioning agency in a way that is both dispassionate and 
objective. However, as demand for more detailed, prescriptive, practical and positive forms of 
PEA grows so the likelihood of bias and omission is likely to be higher, hence the imperative of 
exploring more openly and realistically the process by which PEA is produced and utilised. The 
discussion of complexity in the previous section reinforces the case for paying closer attention to 
how PEA relates to aid processes and relationships. More flexible, adaptable and improvised 
approaches imply a need for a more fluid and granular interaction between analysis and action. 
In exploring the move from intervention to interaction frameworks of development practice this 
section explores how this entails a more explicit treatment of the micro-politics of relations 
between donors and other stakeholders, including the consultants they commission to assist 
them with PEA.  
A starting point for this discussion is the dominant mode of development action as a series of 
time bound episodes of planned intervention based on explicit goals, causal steps and resource 
requirements – often in the form of a logical framework. The DoC framework echoes this in 
distinguishing between how things are, how they should be and how to close the gap. More 
generally, PEA can contribute to the identification of the causal chains by which development 
goals are to be achieved by ensuring deployment of agency resources in ways that are more 
congruent and align with local structures and institutions. It can also assist in appraising the 
capacities and incentives of other stakeholders required to deliver complementary resources, 
and the risks of opposition or indifference. PEA can also assist in appraisal of modalities for 
scaling up or mainstreaming pilot interventions. Likewise, it can play an important role in 
evaluation of why projects fail. 
Much of the criticism of this position is based on the view that what development agencies take 
on is simply too complicated to be planned in this way (Hirschman, 1967: 1-9; Easterly, 2006; 
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Barder, 2010; Mowles et al, 2008 and Mowles, 2010).9 PEA can, therefore, be viewed as part of 
the reformist quest to find better ways of dealing with complexity. This perhaps corresponds 
favourably with another response, which is, to restrict interventions to fewer and simpler tasks 
that can be achieved and evaluated more reliably – particularly during periods of general budget 
austerity. However, a more imaginative alternative is to reframe development management in a 
way that recognises its complexity as a “wicked problem” (Grint, 2005) requiring a more 
consultative, experimental and iterative processes. 
Grint (2005) describes three mechanisms for legitimising authority and leadership: presenting 
problems as “critical” legitimises coercive responses or the use of hard power; presenting them 
as “tame” suggest scope for calculative and negotiated solutions, but “wicked” problems favour 
a leadership style that consults and invites wider collaboration. Thus, while the use of PEA 
frameworks reviewed in this paper can be criticised along with logical framework analysis as an 
attempt to sanitise and professionalise development management (Mowles, 2010: 153), a less 
reified approach to it has the potential to stimulate wider political debate about development 
and greater consultation, including between donor and recipient policymakers (see also Booth, 
2011).   
One step in this direction is for PEA to incorporate a fuller and richer comparison of the 
contrasting ways of thinking or ’mental models’ about development of key stakeholders to a 
project. The bigger the project and the more diverse the range of stakeholders the more 
complex is the task of ensuring that there is sufficient mutual understanding not only of key 
goals, but also rules and norms of how to pursue them. Copestake (2011) contrasts “single gap” 
thinking implicit in much PEA with “triple gap” thinking in development practice that 
systematically identifies such disjuncture.10 A growing “aidnography” literature attests to the 
often disastrous effects of such disconnects (Lewis and Mosse, 2006). Indeed, given the desire 
for supporting recipient countries ownership, understanding the nature and strength of such 
disconnects is critical to successful implementation. While such failure can conveniently be 
attributed by donors to others, they also share responsibility for not anticipating and adapting to 
non-aligned priorities and incentives.11  
However, disjunctures or disconnects between stakeholders are rarely solely semantic. Indeed, 
power structures underpinning the aid chain itself often limit the scope for improvised or 
romantic development management. For example, Grammig (2002) provides a detailed 
ethnographic study of such dynamics based on case studies of two technology transfer projects 
involving three parties – donor, expatriate ‘expert’ and local counterpart. He found that the 
                                                          
9
 An important variant on this position is that development may not be inherently complex, but made 
so by meddling “counter-bureaucrats” who insist on impossibly tight and rigorous procedures for 
monitoring expenditure and measuring results (Natsios, 2010). 
10
 The first gap is the difference between universal goals of development (e.g. the MDGs) and 
estimates of how far there are attained by a designated group. A second gap is the difference between 
the goals or aspirations of this group and how satisfied they are with achievement of them. The third 
gap is the difference between these two perspectives. 
11
 Martins et al (2002) formally explore these issues using principal-agency theory and other 
standard tools of microeconomics, with particular reference to the role of consultants’ provision of 
technical assistance. Williamson (2008) investigates varying degrees of donor and government 
alignment in Ethiopia. Bevan (2000) reveals wide divergence among stakeholders in their perception 
of whether development consultancies were successful or not. 
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effectiveness of both projects was constrained by tensions between expatriates and locals 
arising not from cross-cultural misunderstandings or technical disagreements, but from 
structural differences in their relationship to the timing and financing of the project by donors, 
including differences in capacity to exit from the project. Any PEA that excluded these aspects of 
projects’ design would have revealed little about their success or failure.12   
This discussion suggests that any role PEA can play in shifting the meta-mental model of 
development management from mechanistic/mainstream to organic/romantic requires more 
explicit discussion of the politics of who conducts PEA, for whom and how. In short, and 
somewhat ironically, the political implications of PEA often remain inadequately conceptualised. 
Hughes and Hutchison (2008:18) make this point particularly forcefully: “there has been 
insufficient recognition that contention over development represents more than transitory 
conflict over temporary or compensable costs attached to the process of change. The donor 
literature retains these weak conceptions of politics precisely because they permit avoidance of 
the full implications of political analysis: namely the need to take sides politically in order to 
promote poverty reduction goals”. Having made this point they then draw a useful distinction 
between opportunistic, pragmatic and idealistic practice that hinges on how far donors rely on 
tactical alliances with powerful interests, or seek more fundamental political transformation 
through direct empowerment of the poor and politically weak. 
4.2. The role of the PEA practitioner: from Marx to Machiavelli? 
In the remainder of this section we examine the implications of this argument for the practical 
task of carrying out PEA. The immediate issue facing any development agency commissioning 
such work is to make a realistic assessment of its own comparative advantage. PEA may be 
conducted by the agency’s own staff, or it may be contracted out to consultants, including those 
with important local contextual knowledge. This obviously has a bearing on how far the PEA is 
expected to move from diagnosis to detailed policy prescription. In separating PEA from its use, 
those commissioning the study implicitly assume they (or other sub-contractors) will be better 
able than the PEA consultant to address these downstream tasks separately. The flipside of an 
external consultant’s possible lack of insider knowledge is critical detachment and possibly a 
better understanding of how the agency is perceived by others. But allowing an outsider to shine 
the analytical spotlight of PEA too strongly onto the commissioning organisation itself is 
potentially distracting, internally destabilising and politically risky. 
Even within a bilateral contractual relationship for an entirely externally focused PEA, a 
consultant may move beyond the role of obedient servant (bound by formal terms of reference) 
by offering informal views about the need for internal changes.13 For example, the PEA may be 
intended specifically to provide key internal messages that build on prior relationships of the 
analyst. PEA may also serve both as a loss-leader for the consultant and as a pre-screening 
device for the commissioner. In the language of institutional economics, consultants seeking 
                                                          
12
 See also the distinction between foreign versus indigenously introduced indigenous and exogenous 
institutions explored by Boettke et al (2008). 
13
 Andersson and Auer (2005) explore these issues by drawing on interviews with contractors for the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) in Zambia. Wood (1998) offers a rare 
in-depth case study of competition between consultants thrown together in a single aid mission. See 
also Mahoney and Thelen (2009) for a useful classification of different kinds of change agents. 
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new markets compete in selection tournaments to lower the initial information asymmetry 
between principal and agent. If so, then success entails not only demonstrating professional 
competence as an analyst but also political savvy in coming in ‘on-message’. Indeed, the art is 
even finer: the analyst needs to convincingly justify the political message in the language of 
dispassionate PEA; and at the same time judge how far it is possible to go ‘off message’ in order 
to retain professional and personal integrity and reputation. This is also a game played over 
several rounds, as mutual trust generates opportunities for analysts to win follow-up work, 
participate in internal debates within the commissioning agency and represent it externally. 
More experienced consultants and counterparts are likely to have learnt how to work around 
tensions arising from the micro-political economy of their contrasting relationship to 
development modalities and finance. For example, at critical moments in building a working 
relationship they may find ways to signal to each other how their personal and official views 
(and identity) diverge. However, in doing so they take the risk that any break from the official 
norms and rules of their structural relationship may backfire. And the possibility of virtuoso 
cross-cultural performance should not obscure the dominant position of the funder to dictate 
terms of the consultancy. 
Emphasising the complexity, diversity and uncertainty of the terrain for development 
management also suggests a more fluid role for the political economy practitioner, such as that 
specified by Room’s (2011) “agile policy toolkit”. He highlights eight non-sequential processes of 
policy making which the agile policy maker must continuously weave between, adapting to 
situations and allowing each of these processes to co-evolve with the others.14 This requires a 
conventional PEA framework/toolkit to be augmented with a ‘reflexive’ focus to take into 
account the two (or more sides) of the aid relationship. In this sense, PEA can be viewed as a 
sequential game of joint and independent analysis and action between potential collaborators. 
Joint action creates new opportunities for information sharing and analysis, and vice versa; 
thereby opening up possible virtuous circles of deepening collaboration, as well as vicious circles 
of estrangement and conflict. Proceeding cautiously, an important part of the role of PEA is to 
identify obstacles as well as opportunities. This makes it politically sensitive and opens up the 
potential for a trade-off between openness and potency of analysis. Formal aid modalities based 
on rational-actor assumptions and tidy logical frameworks can serve as a convenient 
smokescreen for the messy informal politics that inevitably occupy much of practitioners’ time 
(Eyben, 2010). 
This section has suggested that practical PEA requires the analytical skills of Machiavelli as well 
as of Marx. There are two points here. The first is about the need to incorporate the micro-
politics of development agencies own inter-relationships into PEA. The second is that doing 
recognises at least some room for manoeuvre on the part of the commissioning development 
agency to change the way it operates in the light of such analysis. These points are explored 
further in Section 5 which points towards an approach to PEA that is both more self-critical and 
iterative. 
                                                          
14
 They are: map the landscape, identify the protagonists, model the struggle, watch for tipping points, 
tune the landscape, energise the protagonists, civilise the struggle, watch for predators. For a 
summary explanation see, http://www.bath.ac.uk/soc-pol/people/gjroom-policy-making.html 
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5. Finding the spaces for change 
This final section provides some tentative views on the future possibilities for more reflexive and 
interactive PEA to enhance development effectiveness. This is elaborated through reflection, in 
the light of the arguments put forward in the previous section, on five areas for reform of PEA 
practice identified by practitioners (World Bank Institute and CommGap, 2010). In each case we 
contrast a reformist position with more radical and romantic perspectives. 
5.1 Identifying room for manoeuvre for reform 
A common worry is that increased realism generated by PEA can contribute to fatalism, and loss 
of belief in the feasibility of reform. For example, Duncan and Williams (2012) note the risk of 
PEA being regarded as “the dismal science of constraints” and while others emphasise the need 
to seek (and presumably find) possibilities for change and ways in which PEA can assist in 
promoting local approaches to resolving problems. As Levy (2011), an architect of the World 
Bank’s thinking to PEA, comments, effective action works with the grain of a dynamic, adaptive 
process in the hope it can “nudge” it forward.15  
From a radical perspective this point illustrates the charade of much of the effort to ground 
development practice in reality – nudging towards the same end goals still implies a rational 
controlled intervention model. It also illustrates the way in which consultants may be forced to 
prostitute themselves if they are to maintain favour with clients: while there is much talk of 
evidence based policy making, this always opens up possibilities for policy based selection of 
supportive evidence. From a more romantic perspective, in contrast, a more realistic 
understanding of local political constraints and complexity may strengthen support for deeper 
and more open consultation in pursuit of more contextualised policy. And greater recognition of 
this reinforces the case for optimism and experimentation: better false positives than false 
negatives. 
5.2 Knowledge-driven change: combining diagnosis and coalition 
building  
Much of development practice can be regarded as a process of establishing the basis for 
collective action to promote pro-poor change. However, there is a lack of clarity within PEA 
between this task and that of data collection and analysis. The World Bank approaches 
presented in this paper aim to identify and provide a focal point for change: clearly 
communicating the benefits of collective action; revealing the credibility and legitimacy (or 
otherwise) of potential stakeholders; generating evidence and providing the rationale for 
broadening coalitions; and last but not least, helping to get the timing and sequencing of action 
right.  
From a radical perspective, this again errs on the side of misplaced optimism in focusing on long-
term positive-sum games rather than the short-term zero-sum struggles that are the stuff of 
‘tribal’ politics between well entrenched interests. On the other hand, recognition that analysis 
and action cannot be rigidly demarcated, and that differences in perception are key influences 
                                                          
15
 Work by the Centre for the Future State (IDS, 2010) and ODI’s ‘Africa Power and Politics’ 
programme provide specific examples. See also Booth (2011) which sets out the potential role for 
development actors in facilitating collective action solving through informed political analysis. 
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on policy outcomes is meat-and-drink to a romantic perspective. The view that collective action 
is a messy and cumulative trial-and-error process of building coalitions also fits well with a 
romantic and complexity perspective on development practice (Room 2011). In this sense, 
rather than informing the ‘alignment strategies’ of development agencies through seeking 
specific ‘progressive change elements’, the role of PEA is to identify networks and relationships 
where consultation and collaboration, mutual learning,  exploration of divergent mental models 
and emergent possibilities might occur.  
5.3 Challenging knowledge production processes: for whom and by 
whom 
The World Bank and CommGap (2010) conference report is mostly consistent with the two 
World Bank frameworks in emphasising the role of PEA in supporting the political activities of 
other stakeholders in favour of reform. This entails giving more emphasis to dissemination of 
information to selected local actors and their participation in analysis. More specifically, it 
suggests a stronger focus on civil society to address the “chronic misalignment of objectives 
between donors and client governments (Ibid: 4)”. To do so, all commentators argue that the 
findings of PEA need to be clearer and simpler.  
What is most striking about this is the extent to which engagement with civil society is presented 
not as a form of dialogue but as a means to achieving already finalised development goals. This 
can be interpreted from a radical perspective as a brazen bid to co-opt civil society onto the side 
of donor ‘patrons’ in their struggle to secure compliance of ‘client’ governments. Further, the 
reformist desire to make PEA ‘clearer’ reaffirms its position as an instrumental tool. In contrast, 
innovation in knowledge production from a romantic perspective starts with recognition of 
pervasive uncertainty and the fragmented nature of understanding. Ambiguity and 
disagreement may open up space for open, plural and reciprocal learning leading to more 
creative policy possibilities. This suggests movement from set piece PEA studies to a more 
iterative approach to PEA that involves more stakeholders in the knowledge production process.  
5.4 Operationalising PEA 
Reformist ideas for improving the operational value of PEA include: refining tools for mapping 
actors and gaining a better insight into their incentives; developing innovative ways to link 
coalition groups together to address collective action issues, including through use of cell phones 
and other technology; incorporating PEA more fully into monitoring and evaluation to assess real 
time risks to reform processes; moving from standardised frameworks to sector and problem 
specific approaches; and linking PEA to scenario analysis, which can then be used to elicit 
feedback and build links with key stakeholders. Enhancing the predictive element of PEA, 
including through better gauging of public and private sector opinion, can also help build the 
case for context specific or “second best” policy choices relative to universal prescriptions 
(Endlemen 2009).  
Such suggestions indicate support for more open co-production of PEA, and for relaxing the 
boundary between analysis and action. But they do not seem to challenge the basic assumption 
that donor agencies commissioning PEA should remain at the centre of policy development 
processes. In addition, they do not change the fundamental framing that donor agencies can 
predict and control processes of development. Nor do they go very far in reflecting on the broad 
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political economy of donors themselves within the policy process. Mowles et al (2008) also 
emphasise the methodological individualism inherent in logical frameworks and similar planning 
tools - with complexity relegated to the ‘assumptions and risks’ column. To that end PEA 
becomes another tool or lever to use to achieve change.   
A more complex and less prescriptive PEA recognises the potential benefits of accommodating 
messier but more open processes of interaction and performance in policy-making. Approaching 
problems with agility and art entails being more honest about the shared knowledge base on 
which decisions are made, the inevitability of making mistakes, the importance of learning from 
them, and the challenge of trying to hit constantly moving targets. This is not incompatible with 
target setting and measurement of results but does have a bearing on how they are set 
(including room for more cooperation), as well as how shortfalls are interpreted.  
5.5 Mainstreaming PEA within development practice 
A number of commentators highlighted the challenge of publically airing politically sensitive 
views. This is despite topics such as corruption and vested interests being increasingly discussed 
in mainstream policy debate. Participants recognised that consistency demands PEA should 
likewise stimulate debate over the internal constraints on donors to mainstreaming PEA within 
policy design and implementation, including the need to deliver and demonstrate quick and 
measurable results within rigid and often unrealistic timeframes. The recognition of the 
structural constraints to donor practice fits well with the more reflexive romantic perspective on 
aid management. The international dialogue on aid effectiveness leading to Busan can be cited 
as evidence that there is some willingness to acknowledge the institutional problems of donors 
alongside those of aid recipients and explore an agenda for addressing both based on mutual 
accountability. 
A radical response is to be sceptical that PEA of development agencies themselves will greatly 
weaken Western control over donor policies or significantly modify the way they operate. Both 
the managerialist approach adopted at Paris to measure and monitor progress against fixed 
targets, and lack of sanctions in punishing failure to achieve them can be cited as evidence of 
this. In reverting to more fluid dialogue around a diverse set of ‘building blocks’, the outcome of 
Busan suggests a more romantic approach, but one open to criticism in turn for lack of specificity 
and ‘teeth’ from both reformist and radical perspectives. But the change in style can in part be 
attributed to the need to accommodate non-traditional donors, opening up new possibilities of 
departure from the dominance of Western influence (via the OECD as well as the World Bank) 
over the aid industry. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has examined the interest of traditional aid donors in PEA, exploring on-going 
debates among its practitioners over how to make it more useful in the light of theoretical 
debates over the nature of development management.  In viewing aid effectiveness as a wicked 
problem, we have highlighted the importance not only of increased consultation but also 
reflexivity and adaptability on the part of donors. If PEA is regarded solely as a technocratic 
means to better understanding the commitment and capacity of others, without opening up 
opportunities for internal learning and adjustment then its role in enhancing aid effectiveness 
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will be correspondingly limited. Indeed, there is a somewhat sinister aspect to suggesting 
improvements to the toolkit of PEA by brushing up on Machiavelli as well as Marx. Recognising 
that development management is in reality less a form of intervention than a process of 
interaction and discovery we have affirmed the romantic case for more open dialogue and for 
closer integration of analysis and action.16 
At the same time reformist, radical and romantic positions can be viewed as alternative mental 
models for addressing not a single development problem but a complex, diverse and uncertain 
set of inter-related development problems. If so, then their relative explanatory power will vary: 
some development tasks are wicked than others. Hence, while critical of the dominance of the 
reformist position we are not rejecting the role of planned intervention outright, but arguing for 
locating it within fuller and more honest political economy analysis: sensitive to diverse contexts 
and to the interaction between ways of thinking about and doing development at global, 
national and sub-national levels (Gaventa, 2006).  No universal framework for PEA can ever 
realistically encapsulate such complexity; but that is an argument for more political economy 
analysis of aid effectiveness rather than less, including more empirical research into the use of 
PEA itself.  
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